globals [ num-sellers ;; market internals monopoly-quantity ;; the amount that would be supplied by a monopoly monopoly-price ;; the price at a monopoly equilibrium real-supply ;; the actual quantity supplied current-price ;; the price last time oil was sold at market perfect-market-quantity ;; the amount that would be supplied under perfect competition perfect-market-price ;; the price at equilibrium in perfect competition market-inefficiency ;; the deadweight loss ;; is oil going to market? market-running? ;; news-related variables (for sending market news to the client) age-of-news ;; age of news, so we can clear old news caught-cheating ;; list of who was caught cheating ;; gotta keep track of these to know when to redraw S&D graphs last-demand-sensitivity last-base-demand last-marginal-cost ;; quick start instructions variables quick-start ;; current quickstart instruction displayed in the quickstart monitor qs-item ;; index of the current quickstart instruction qs-items ;; list of quickstart instructions ] breed [ sellers seller ] ;; every client is a seller breed [ buyers buyer ] ;; consumers running around the market buyers-own [ supplied? ;; is the market supplying this buyer? ] sellers-own [ user-id ;; unique user-id, input by the client when they log in amount-to-cheat ;; last known value of the client's amount-to-cheat slider anti-cheat-investment ;; last known value of the client's anti-cheat-investment slider real-amount ;; the actual amount of oil that was sold last time to market rank ;; rank number according to bank account balance received-rank? ;; blech, there has got to be a better way to do ranks bank-account ;; amount of money in the user's bank account last-sale-profit ;; how much money the user made last time oil was sold at market penalties-paid ;; how much in total penalties has the user paid? income-from-penalties ;; how much total income has the user made from catching cheaters? ] ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; STARTUP - auto-setup when the model is opened ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to startup hubnet-reset ;; Set up the Quick Start window quick-start-reset ;; Set up global variables init-globals end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; RE-RUN - reset everything for a new simulation ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to re-run ;; Reset all of our market and seller variables ask sellers [ init-seller-vars ] init-globals ;; Update the client displays and notify them of the reset update-clients send-news-item "The simulation has been reset!" ;; Reset the "amount supplied" plot set-current-plot "Oil Sold at Market" clear-plot end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; INIT-GLOBALS - initialize our global variables ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to init-globals set num-sellers 0 set market-running? false set perfect-information? true set age-of-news 0 set caught-cheating [] end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; INITIAL-LOGIN - listen for clients and establish them as ;; sellers ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to initial-login set market-running? false ;; Listen for logins, etc. listen-to-clients ;; Recalculate market conditions recompute-market-internals update-clients run-market-buyers ;; Keep the supply and demand graph updated if market-characteristics-changed? [ plot-supply-and-demand ] log-market-characteristics end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; RUN-MARKET - run the market simulation ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to run-market if (market-running? != true) [ plot-supply-and-demand ] ;; Turn off the display if needed ifelse (perfect-information? = true) [ display ] [ no-display ] set market-running? true ;; Check if clients have moved their sliders listen-to-clients ;; Calculate market conditions recompute-market-internals ;; Sell the oil and distribute the profits sell-oil-at-market ;; The cartel members may investigate cheaters on every turn catch-cheaters ;; Do a visualization of the market's inefficiencies run-market-buyers ;; Plot the amount of oil that was sold plot-oil-amounts ;; Keep the supply and demand graph updated if market-characteristics-changed? [ plot-supply-and-demand ] log-market-characteristics ;; Update seller ranks rank-sellers ;; Update client monitors, etc. update-clients end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; RECOMPUTE-MARKET-INTERNALS - recompute the market ;; using the latest info... ;; no oil is actually sold ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to recompute-market-internals ;; Check the number of sellers set num-sellers count sellers ;; Determine the profit-maximizing total quantity the cartel should produce if it were ;; behaving as a unitary monopolist. Economic theory predicts that is will be were MR = MC ;; Solving for quantity results in the equations below set monopoly-quantity filter-zero-or-greater (round ((base-demand - marginal-cost) / (2 * demand-sensitivity))) set monopoly-price filter-zero-or-greater (base-demand - (demand-sensitivity * monopoly-quantity)) ;; The actual amount supplied, including cheating ifelse num-sellers > 0 and market-running? = true [ set real-supply monopoly-quantity + sum [amount-to-cheat] of sellers] [ set real-supply 0 ] ;; The current price set current-price filter-zero-or-greater (base-demand - (demand-sensitivity * real-supply)) ;; Determine what the total quantity would be if this were a perfectly competitive market ;; Economic theory predicts that price = mc. Solving for quantity results in the equations below set perfect-market-quantity filter-zero-or-greater (round ((base-demand - marginal-cost) / demand-sensitivity)) set perfect-market-price (base-demand - (demand-sensitivity * perfect-market-quantity)) ;; Calculate the market's inefficiency, the "deadweight loss" set market-inefficiency (0.5 * (perfect-market-quantity - real-supply) * (current-price - perfect-market-price)) end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; SELL OIL AT MARKET - complete the sales transactions ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to sell-oil-at-market let base-amount-to-sell 0 ifelse (num-sellers > 0) [ set base-amount-to-sell (monopoly-quantity / num-sellers)] [ set base-amount-to-sell 0 ] ask sellers [ ;; Figure out how much to really sell set real-amount base-amount-to-sell + amount-to-cheat set last-sale-profit (real-amount * current-price) - (real-amount * marginal-cost) set bank-account bank-account + last-sale-profit ] end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; CATCH-CHEATERS - cartel members may investigate whether ;; anybody else is cheating ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to catch-cheaters ;; Only those sellers with an anti-cheat investment may investigate ask sellers with [ anti-cheat-investment > 0 ] [ ;; Charge the seller for the anti-cheat investment -- percentage of gross revenues let investigation-cost ((anti-cheat-investment / 100) * real-amount * current-price) set last-sale-profit last-sale-profit - investigation-cost set bank-account bank-account - investigation-cost ;; Conduct an investigation of potential cheaters (other cartel members) ask other sellers with [ amount-to-cheat > 0] [ ;; Chance of getting caught is directly related to how much was invested in catching the cheater if (random 100) <= ([anti-cheat-investment] of myself) [ ;; Caught! Calculate the penalty let penalty penalty-severity * amount-to-cheat * current-price ;; Remember who was caught for the news set caught-cheating lput user-id caught-cheating ;; Take the penalty from the cheater... set last-sale-profit last-sale-profit - penalty set bank-account bank-account - penalty set penalties-paid penalties-paid + penalty ;; And give it to the investigator. ask myself [ set last-sale-profit last-sale-profit + [penalty] of myself set bank-account bank-account + [penalty] of myself set income-from-penalties income-from-penalties + [penalty] of myself ] ] ] ] end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; LISTEN-TO-CLIENTS - handle connecting clients ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to listen-to-clients while [ hubnet-message-waiting? ] [ hubnet-fetch-message ifelse hubnet-enter-message? [ create-new-seller hubnet-message-source ] [ ifelse hubnet-exit-message? [ remove-seller hubnet-message-source ] [ execute-command hubnet-message-tag ] ] ] end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; EXECUTE-COMMAND - execute the command received ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to execute-command [command] ifelse command = "amount-to-cheat" [ ask sellers with [user-id = hubnet-message-source] [ set amount-to-cheat hubnet-message ] ] [if command = "anti-cheat-investment" [ ask sellers with [user-id = hubnet-message-source] [ set anti-cheat-investment hubnet-message ] ]] end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; CREATE-NEW-SELLER - create a new seller when a client ;; joins ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to create-new-seller [ id ] create-sellers 1 [ set user-id id ;; remember which client this is ht init-seller-vars ;; Replot supply-and-demand so it gets mirrored ;; plot-supply-and-demand ;; too slow w/mirroring, commented out for now ;; Announce the arrival of a new seller send-news-item (word "A new seller '" user-id "' has arrived.") ] end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; INIT-SELLER-VARS - initialize the seller's variables ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to init-seller-vars ;; seller procedure set bank-account 0 set bank-account 0 set received-rank? false set rank "N/A" set last-sale-profit 0 set income-from-penalties 0 set penalties-paid 0 end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; UPDATE-CLIENTS - update the info in the clients' displays ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to update-clients ;; Broadcast some market data hubnet-broadcast "Price of Oil" precision current-price 2 if not empty? caught-cheating [ send-news-item word "Caught cheating: " caught-cheating ] ;; Send individual data ask sellers [ hubnet-send user-id "# Suppliers" precision num-sellers 0 hubnet-send user-id "Bank Account" precision (bank-account / 1000000) 3 hubnet-send user-id "Current Profit" precision last-sale-profit 4 hubnet-send user-id "Penalties Paid" precision (penalties-paid / 1000000) 3 hubnet-send user-id "Income From Penalties" precision (income-from-penalties / 1000000) 3 hubnet-send user-id "Rank" rank hubnet-send user-id "Severity of Penalties" penalty-severity ] ;; Clear old news items if age-of-news > 15 [ send-news-item " " ] set age-of-news age-of-news + 1 set caught-cheating [] end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; REMOVE-SELLER - remove a seller from the simulation ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to remove-seller [ id ] ask sellers with [ user-id = id ] [ die ] end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; RUN-MARKET-BUYERS - use the graphics display as a visual ;; representation of the market's ;; inefficiency ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to run-market-buyers ;; How many buyers should we draw? let num-buyers-to-draw max list perfect-market-quantity real-supply ;; How many buyers are unable to buy wanted supplies? let num-unsupplied-buyers max list (perfect-market-quantity - real-supply) 0 ;; Adjust our buyer quantities ifelse (count buyers) < num-buyers-to-draw [ ;; need more buyers create-buyers (num-buyers-to-draw - (count buyers)) [ ;; set shape "truck" ;; this shape is no good... fd random (max-pxcor * 2) set color green ] ][ ;; need fewer buyers ask n-of ((count buyers) - num-buyers-to-draw) buyers [ die ] ] ;; If oversupplied, change all undersupplied buyers green if real-supply > perfect-market-quantity [ ask buyers with [ color = red or color = yellow ] [ set color green ]] ;; If undersupplied, change all oversupplied buyers green if real-supply < perfect-market-quantity [ask buyers with [ color = magenta ] [ set color green ]] ;; Adjust our buyer colors adjust-buyer-color-population red green num-unsupplied-buyers adjust-buyer-color-population magenta green (filter-zero-or-greater (real-supply - perfect-market-quantity)) ;; Move the buyers around ask buyers with [color = green or color = yellow or color = magenta] [ ;; Don't go forward if there's a red buyer there ifelse count (buyers-at dx dy) with [color = red] > 0 [ rt random 10 ;; better try to turn around... set color yellow ;; indicate that we're being inconvenienced by under-supplied buyers ][ fd 1 if color != magenta [ set color green ] ] ] end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; UTILITY PROCEDURES - useful stuff ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to-report buyers-in-the-way? [ range ] ;; buyer procedure let counter 0 while [ counter < range ] [ set counter (counter + 1) ;; Check if there's a red buyer there if count ((buyers-at (xcor + (counter * dx)) (ycor + (counter * dy))) with [color = red]) > 0 [ report true ] ] report false end to-report filter-zero-or-greater [ value ] ifelse (value >= 0) [ report value ] [ report 0 ] end to send-news-item [ msg-text ] hubnet-broadcast "Market News" msg-text set age-of-news 0 end to-report market-characteristics-changed? report (demand-sensitivity != last-demand-sensitivity) or (base-demand != last-base-demand) or (marginal-cost != last-marginal-cost) end to log-market-characteristics set last-demand-sensitivity demand-sensitivity set last-base-demand base-demand set last-marginal-cost marginal-cost end ;; Adjust the buyer population's colors so that there is the specified number of the ;; desired color, with those that have been pushed out set to the neutral color to adjust-buyer-color-population [ color-desired neutral-color num-desired ] let original-num count buyers with [ color = color-desired ] if num-desired = original-num [ stop ] ifelse (num-desired < original-num) [ ;; too many "color-desired" buyers repeat (original-num - num-desired) [ ask one-of (buyers with [color = color-desired]) [ set color neutral-color ] ] ][ ;; not enough "color-desired" buyers repeat (num-desired - original-num) [ ask one-of (buyers with [color != color-desired]) [ set color color-desired ] ] ] end ;; Rank who's winning--code borrowed from the TOTC to rank-sellers let num-ranks (length (remove-duplicates ([bank-account] of sellers))) let rank# count sellers repeat num-ranks [ let min-rev min [bank-account] of sellers with [not received-rank?] let rankee sellers with [bank-account = min-rev] let num-tied count rankee ask rankee [ set rank rank# set received-rank? true ] set rank# rank# - num-tied ] ask sellers [set received-rank? false] end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; PLOTTING PROCEDURES ;; --------------------------------------------------------- to plot-oil-amounts set-current-plot "Oil Sold At Market" set-current-plot-pen "Monopoly" plot monopoly-quantity set-current-plot-pen "Competitive" plot perfect-market-quantity set-current-plot-pen "Real" plot real-supply end to plot-supply-and-demand ;; Clients don't get to see this if perfect information is off if perfect-information? = false [ stop ] set-current-plot "Supply and Demand" clear-plot ;; Plot until demand crosses the x-axis (until demand's price is 0) let quantity 0 while [ (base-demand - (demand-sensitivity * quantity)) >= 0 ] [ ;; Plot demand set-current-plot-pen "Demand" plot (base-demand - (demand-sensitivity * quantity)) ;; Plot marginal revenue set-current-plot-pen "Marginal Revenue" if base-demand - (2 * demand-sensitivity * quantity) >= 0 [ plot (base-demand - (2 * demand-sensitivity * quantity)) ] ;; Plot marginal cost set-current-plot-pen "Marginal Cost" plot marginal-cost set quantity (quantity + 1) ] set-plot-x-range 0 quantity end ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; QUICK START PROCEDURES - Code to run the Quick Start ;; info tab for teachers. ;; --------------------------------------------------------- ;; Instructions to quickly setup the model, and clients to run this activity to quick-start-reset set qs-item 0 set qs-items [ "Teacher: Follow these directions to run the HubNet activity." "Optional: Zoom In (see Tools in the Menu Bar)" "Teacher: Open 'HubNet Control Center' from 'Tools' menu..." "and check 'Mirror Plots on Clients' and..." "check 'Mirror View on Clients.'" "Teacher: Press the INITIAL-LOGIN button." "Everyone: Open up a HubNet Client on your machine and..." "input the IP Address of this computer, press ENTER and..." "type your user name in the box and press ENTER." "Optional: Change any of the settings." "Teacher: Once all users are logged in..." "turn off the INITIAL-LOGIN button." "Teacher: Press the RUN-MARKET button to start." "Everyone: If you would like to sell extra oil..." "change the value of the AMOUNT-TO-CHEAT slider." "Everyone: If you would like to catch other sellers cheating..." "change the value of the ANTI-CHEAT-INVESTMENT slider." "Teacher: To rerun the activity with the same group..." "press the RE-RUN button." "[end of Quick Start instructions]" ] set quick-start (item qs-item qs-items) end ;; view the next item in the quickstart monitor to quick-start-next set qs-item qs-item + 1 if qs-item >= length qs-items [ set qs-item length qs-items - 1 ] set quick-start (item qs-item qs-items) end ;; view the previous item in the quickstart monitor to quick-start-prev set qs-item qs-item - 1 if qs-item < 0 [ set qs-item 0 ] set quick-start (item qs-item qs-items) end ; Copyright 2004 Uri Wilensky. ; See Info tab for full copyright and license. @#$#@#$#@ GRAPHICS-WINDOW 518 101 864 468 10 10 16.0 1 10 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 -10 10 -10 10 1 1 1 ticks SLIDER 9 355 181 388 demand-sensitivity demand-sensitivity 0.25 5 2.75 0.05 1 NIL HORIZONTAL MONITOR 9 275 84 320 # Sellers num-sellers 0 1 11 MONITOR 88 275 183 320 Deadw. Loss market-inefficiency 3 1 11 TEXTBOX 7 335 97 353 Buyers: 11 0.0 0 TEXTBOX 7 437 97 455 Sellers: 11 0.0 0 TEXTBOX 6 204 132 222 Market information: 11 0.0 0 BUTTON 9 30 106 63 initial-login initial-login T 1 T OBSERVER NIL NIL NIL NIL 1 SLIDER 9 392 181 425 base-demand base-demand 0 1000 130 10 1 NIL HORIZONTAL BUTTON 7 142 181 175 run-market run-market T 1 T OBSERVER NIL NIL NIL NIL 1 SLIDER 9 456 181 489 marginal-cost marginal-cost 0 100 57.5 0.25 1 $ HORIZONTAL PLOT 206 10 501 189 Oil Sold At Market Time Quantity 0.0 20.0 0.0 5.0 true false "" "" PENS "Monopoly" 1.0 0 -2674135 true "" "" "Competitive" 1.0 0 -10899396 true "" "" "Real" 1.0 0 -8630108 true "" "" MONITOR 357 401 501 446 Competitive Price perfect-market-price 2 1 11 MONITOR 9 222 84 267 Price current-price 2 1 11 MONITOR 209 476 352 521 Monopoly Quantity monopoly-quantity 3 1 11 TEXTBOX 7 79 169 97 Market: 11 0.0 0 MONITOR 209 401 352 446 Competitive Quantity perfect-market-quantity 2 1 11 MONITOR 87 222 183 267 Quantity Sold real-supply 0 1 11 PLOT 206 194 501 376 Supply and Demand Quantity Price 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 true false "" "" PENS "Demand" 1.0 0 -2674135 true "" "" "Marginal Revenue" 1.0 0 -13345367 true "" "" "Marginal Cost" 1.0 0 -10899396 true "" "" BUTTON 109 30 182 63 re-run re-run NIL 1 T OBSERVER NIL NIL NIL NIL 1 SLIDER 9 492 181 525 penalty-severity penalty-severity 0 25 7 1 1 x HORIZONTAL SWITCH 7 106 181 139 perfect-information? perfect-information? 0 1 -1000 TEXTBOX 8 10 98 28 Activity: 11 0.0 0 TEXTBOX 206 383 400 401 Perfect Competition Equilibrium: 11 0.0 0 TEXTBOX 206 458 385 476 Monopoly Equilibrium: 11 0.0 0 MONITOR 357 476 501 521 Monopoly Price monopoly-price 2 1 11 MONITOR 518 11 862 56 Quick Start Instructions - More in Info Window quick-start 0 1 11 BUTTON 518 64 646 97 Reset Instructions quick-start-reset NIL 1 T OBSERVER NIL NIL NIL NIL 1 BUTTON 692 64 775 97 <<< Prev quick-start-prev NIL 1 T OBSERVER NIL NIL NIL NIL 1 BUTTON 781 64 862 97 Next >>> quick-start-next NIL 1 T OBSERVER NIL NIL NIL NIL 1 @#$#@#$#@ ## WHAT IS IT? This activity explores the economics of a market with imperfect competition. As members of a cartel, participants experience how jointly determined price and quantity decisions can be advantageous to suppliers and harmful to consumers, but also why a cartel is so difficult to sustain. In this alternate version of Oil Cartel, members can also explicitly make investments to detect and penalize other members who "cheat" on their agreement, in order to explore the role of accurate information in maintaining a cartel. ## HOW IT WORKS The basic behavior of the model is controlled by a set of equations defining aggregate consumer demand, the marginal revenue (MR) curve faced by suppliers as a whole, and the marginal cost curve of suppliers. 1. Aggregate consumer demand is represented by a demand curve that describes how many units of oil the consumers will purchase at any given price-point. From the perspective of the cartel, it can be thought of as providing what price consumers will pay given a particular level of total quantity produced by all its members. In this case, market demand is a downward-sloping linear function of price, where "base-demand" is the price of each unit of oil as the total quantity approaches 0 (i.e., the y-intercept of the linear demand function), and "demand-sensitivity" is the slope of the linear demand function: DEMAND: Price = base-demand - (demand-sensitivity * Quantity) 2. MR is the change in total revenue as a result of producing one more unit of oil: MARGINAL REVENUE: MR = base-demand - (2 * demand-sensitivity * Quantity) This function is the slope of the Total Revenue curve for the cartel. The Total Revenue curve can be determined by multiplying price (i.e., the demand function), by quantity. 3. Marginal cost (MC) is the cost of producing one more unit of oil, assumed to be constant, and controlled by a slider in the server interface. As long as MR is greater than MC, the cartel will be profitable. Indeed, economic theory predicts that the cartel as a whole will be most profitable if it keeps producing right up to the point where MR = MC. This equilibrium is given displayed on the interface as the "Monopoly Equilibrium". At the Monopoly Equilibrium, the price available for selling an additional unit of product at the Monopoly Equilibrium is usually much higher than the additional cost of producing that product (MC). Consequently at the individual supplier level, each cartel member can make a little more profit by "cheating" and selling a more product. Any change in production by an individual seller changes the total cartel quantity produced, which in turn impacts the overall market price. To prevent cheating, there are two components to the enforcement mechanisms available to the cartel. Clients control their anti-cheat investment using a slider, which represents a percentage of their gross revenue what will be invested to catch cheaters. In return for this investment, the seller has the same percentage chance of catching any other sellers who are cheating. If caught cheating, a seller must pay a penalty to every seller that caught them cheating. The amount of the penalty is the gross revenues from the excess supply multiplied by the penalty-severity, which is controlled by a slider in the server interface: COST TO INVESTIGATE CHEATERS = cheat-investment-% * gross-revenue PENALTY FOR CHEATING = penalty-severity * gross-revenue-from-cheating ## HOW TO USE IT Quickstart Instructions: Teacher: Follow these directions to run the HubNet activity. Optional: Zoom In (see Tools in the Menu Bar) Teacher: Open 'HubNet Control Center' from 'Tools' menu and check 'Mirror Plots on Clients' and check 'Mirror View on Clients.'" Teacher: Press the INITIAL-LOGIN button. Everyone: Open up a HubNet Client on your machine and input the IP Address of this computer, press ENTER and type your user name in the box and press ENTER. Optional: Change any of the settings. Teacher: Once all users are logged in turn off the INITIAL-LOGIN button. Teacher: Press the RUN-MARKET button to start. Everyone: If you would like to sell extra oil change the value of the AMOUNT-TO-CHEAT slider. Everyone: If you would like to catch other sellers cheating change the value of the ANTI-CHEAT-INVESTMENT slider. Teacher: To rerun the activity with the same group press the RE-RUN button. Buttons: INITIAL-LOGIN - Allows sellers to log in to the activity. This forever button should be turned off before beginning the simulation. RUN-MARKET - Runs the simulation. Clients will only be selling oil while the market simulation is running. Turning off this forever button will stop all market activity, although it can be resumed from the same point by clicking the button again. RE-RUN - Resets the bank-accounts (and other variables) of participants so that another experiment may be run with a clean slate. Sliders: DEMAND-SENSITIVITY - Adjusts the sensitivity of the simulated buyers' demand curve. A low value makes the market demand less sensitive to changes in price. High values makes market demand more sensitive to price. BASE-DEMAND - Adjusts the price where the demand curve crosses the y-axis (when quantity is equal to zero). A high base-demand will yield relatively higher prices when a small amount of oil is supplied. MARGINAL-COST - Adjusts the firm's cost to produce one additional unit of oil. This is assumed to be constant regardless of the supplier's current level of production. PENALTY-SEVERITY - Adjusts the severity of the penalty for cartel members who are caught cheating. A severity of 0 means that that is no penalty. The higher the severity, the more the penalty will cost the seller that is caught cheating. The penalty is calculated as PENALTY-SEVERITY multiplied by the gross revenue from cheating. Switches: PERFECT-INFORMATION? - Controls whether the sellers receive the View information depicting the market's efficiency and the supply-and-demand plot. Monitors: "Price" - The last price for which oil sold at market. "Quantity Sold" - The quantity of oil that was most recently sold at market. "# Sellers" - The number of sellers participating in the activity. "Deadw. Loss" - The deadweight loss is a measure of the inefficiency of the market. More specifically it is the value of goods that could have been produced and consumed by the market at the Perfect Competition Equilibrium minus the value of goods that could have been produced and consumed by the market the Monopoly Equilibrium. "Competitive Quantity" - The amount of oil that would be sold in a perfectly competitive market given the aggregate demand and supply schedules. "Competitive Price" - The price that oil would be sold for in a perfectly competitive market given the aggregate demand and supply schedules. Economic theory predicts that this price equals marginal cost under perfect competition. "Monopoly Quantity" - The total of all oil produced by suppliers that would maximize profits if the cartel behaved as a unitary monopolist, given the aggregate demand and supply schedules. "Monopoly Price" - The price of oil that corresponds to the Monopoly Quantity. Plots: "Oil Sold at Market" - Plots the quantities of oil sold at market over time. Also on the graph are the amounts that would be supplied under perfect competition and under a monopoly. Anything less than the amount of perfect competiton and above or equal to the monopoly line is an improvement is better for the cartel than a situation with no collusion, and worse for consumers. "Supply and Demand" - A plot representation of the supply and demand curves described using the parameters in the server interface. View: The view illustrates the market conditions by showing turtles, which represent consumers in the market. The view can be turned on and off to simulate the effects on the market of accurate information. The number of turtles on screen represents the number of consumers who would purchase oil in a perfectly competitive market. GREEN turtles are able to buy the oil and are free to drive their cars around the window. RED turtles cannot move because they are unable to buy oil due to the cartel's output restrictions -- they represent the inefficiencies caused by the cartel. YELLOW turtles are able to buy the oil, but are mired in gridlock -- they are being inconvenienced by the unsupplied red turtles (e.g., waiting in lines at the gas station). Yellow turtles are intended solely as a demonstration of the negative effects of collusive or monopolistic behavior. MAGENTA turtles are the beneficiaries of oil supplied beyond the perfectly competitive equilibrium output. Although they would not be able to afford the oil in a competitive market, the cartel is subsidizing the magenta turtles by operating at a loss. They will only appear if there are enough units of oil sold to drive the price of a unit of oil below the cost of producing that unit. Client Information AMOUNT-TO-CHEAT - A slider that determines how much (if any) oil the seller wants to supply beyond the cartel's agreed-upon monopolistic output. ANTI-CHEAT-INVESTMENT - A slider that determines what percentage of the seller's gross revenues should be invested to catch cheaters. Penalties will be given out to cheaters and paid to the seller if any cheaters are caught. "Bank Account" - A monitor that displays the balance of the seller's bank account. All profits are placed in the seller's bank account. "Rank" - The user's current rank in order of highest bank account balance. "Current Profit" - The profit made by the seller last time oil was sold at market. "Penalties Paid" - The total amount of penalties the user has paid for cheating. "Income From Penalties" - The total amount the user has earned by catching other sellers cheating. "# Suppliers" - The number of sellers who are currently in the market. "Price of Oil" - The most recent price of a single unit of oil at market. "Severity of Penalties" - The server's penalty-severity setting. "Market News" - Information of note. "Supply and Demand" - A plot representation of the supply and demand curves described using the parameters in the server interface. ## THINGS TO NOTICE If there is too much cheating going on by the member, the market price of oil will precipitously drop. In fact, it is even possible that the supply may temporarily move beyond the perfect competition equilibrium output. At this point, the suppliers are actually operating at a loss. Magenta turtles in the View are an indication that this is happening. ## THINGS TO TRY MODIFY THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND CURVES - The temptation to cheat for a cartel member is in part determined by the demand curve and supply curves. Experiment with these market characteristics using the DEMAND-SENSITIVITY, BASE-DEMAND, and MARGINAL-COST sliders in the server interface. In real life, demand for oil is relatively inelastic. How does demand sensitivity affect the incentive to cheat? TURN OFF PERFECT INFORMATION - Perfect information about the market helps sustain a cartel. Does turning of PERFECT-INFORMATION? (preventing clients from seeing the View representation of market inefficiencies) change the behavior of the cartel members? EXPERIMENT WITH PENALTY SEVERITY - The more severe the penalty is for cheating, the less incentive there is for a firm to cheat. Penalties can be changed using the PENALTY-SEVERITY slider in the server interface. ## EXTENDING THE MODEL Here are some suggestions for ways to extend the model: - Convert from a HubNet model to a NetLogo model. The core mechanics of the HubNet model would also make for an interesting single-user exploration of the theory of monopoly. A similar effect can be gained by running this model with only one client connected. - Introduce a notion of "bankruptcy." There are no consequences if a seller's bank account balance goes below zero. If a negative balance led to removal from the market, new competitive strategies would become possible. For example, a seller might flood the market at a loss in order to drive out other sellers and then be more secure reverting to monopoly-like output levels after they are gone. - Make demand more "agent-based". In a real market, aggregate demand is not determined the interaction between buyers and sellers. This would require replacing the functions that control demand with individual buyers that follow their own rules. - Cartel behavior can be model as a prisoner's dilemma situation where the member is always faced with the decision to cooperate or defect in each round. As such, one could create a model where cartel members select strategies over time, as opposed to instantaneous pricing decisions. ## NETLOGO FEATURES Plotting the Supply and Demand Curves: Displaying the supply and demand curves in a plot window is more complicated than a traditional plot. To do so, a while loop iterates through quantity plotting demand, marginal revenue, and marginal cost until the demand curve crosses the x-axis. ## RELATED MODELS Tragedy of the Commons, Gridlock ## CREDITS AND REFERENCES Original implementation: Greg Dunham, for the Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling. ## HOW TO CITE If you mention this model in a publication, we ask that you include these citations for the model itself and for the NetLogo software: * Wilensky, U. (2004). NetLogo HubNet Oil Cartel Alternate model. http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models/HubNetOilCartelAlternate. Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. * Wilensky, U. (1999). NetLogo. http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/. Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. ## COPYRIGHT AND LICENSE Copyright 2004 Uri Wilensky. ![CC BY-NC-SA 3.0](http://i.creativecommons.org/l/by-nc-sa/3.0/88x31.png) This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 559 Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford, California 94305, USA. Commercial licenses are also available. To inquire about commercial licenses, please contact Uri Wilensky at uri@northwestern.edu. This activity and associated models and materials were created as part of the projects: PARTICIPATORY SIMULATIONS: NETWORK-BASED DESIGN FOR SYSTEMS LEARNING IN CLASSROOMS and/or INTEGRATED SIMULATION AND MODELING ENVIRONMENT. The project gratefully acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (REPP & ROLE programs) -- grant numbers REC #9814682 and REC-0126227. @#$#@#$#@ default true 0 Polygon -7500403 true true 150 5 40 250 150 205 260 250 airplane true 0 Polygon -7500403 true true 150 0 135 15 120 60 120 105 15 165 15 195 120 180 135 240 105 270 120 285 150 270 180 285 210 270 165 240 180 180 285 195 285 165 180 105 180 60 165 15 arrow true 0 Polygon -7500403 true true 150 0 0 150 105 150 105 293 195 293 195 150 300 150 box false 0 Polygon -7500403 true true 150 285 285 225 285 75 150 135 Polygon -7500403 true true 150 135 15 75 150 15 285 75 Polygon -7500403 true true 15 75 15 225 150 285 150 135 Line -16777216 false 150 285 150 135 Line -16777216 false 150 135 15 75 Line -16777216 false 150 135 285 75 bug true 0 Circle -7500403 true true 96 182 108 Circle -7500403 true true 110 127 80 Circle -7500403 true true 110 75 80 Line -7500403 true 150 100 80 30 Line -7500403 true 150 100 220 30 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